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Dana Gold: Our next panel discusses the corporatization of com-
munication. I want to introduce the moderator of this session, who is my
colleague, Mr. Eric Chiappinelli. He is our Associate Dean for Alumni
and Professional Relations. More relevant perhaps than his role as mod-
erator is his role as one of our most esteemed professors of business law
here at the law school.
Eric Chiappinelli: Thank you very much, Dana. Thank you all
very much for coming to this session on the corporatization of communi-
cation, vis-A-vis the Madisonian First Amendment. We have three won-
derful speakers. I have had a little preview of what they are going to
discuss, and I know you are going to be engaged and interested in what
they have to say.
Our first speaker is the founder and the Executive Director of the
Center for Digital Democracy. He has also founded a number of other
non-profits regarding media policy. He has also worked on a project on
open access and the future of the Internet. His new book is called Digital
Destiny: New Media and Future Democracy.' Please welcome Jeffrey
Chester.
Jeffrey Chester: Thank you very much. I want to thank Dana Gold
and everybody here for inviting me.
If you look back at what we have in the United States, it is the fail-
ure of the media policy process (and the media industry as a whole) to
effectively develop the kind of civil society sphere that would promote,
ensure, and engage the public with meaningful civic participation. When
you look back, you will see that we do not have a system of diverse
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media ownership; indeed, we have a system where women and people of
color own hardly any of the major outlets. There are increasingly fewer
owners of the major outlets of newspapers, broadcast stations, and cable
systems and their programming channels. You will witness, as the digital
era progresses, further increased consolidation with our media. A key
reason for all this consolidation, and the disregard of what a robust and
public-spirited press and electronic media should provide us, is the very
corrupt nature of media politics in Washington D.C. (as well as state
capitols and city halls). We are facing a very critical transition period as
the so-called old media merges with the "always-on, always-connected"
world of interactive media. We need to look at what is ahead for us if we
want to better protect the public interest.
Key principles for a media of openness, diversity, and access that
should help create a media system that really fulfills a vision of democ-
racy can be fostered, but it can only be accomplished, in my opinion, by
addressing what is about to happen; not, sadly, what was lost years ago
when the Communications Act was enacted in 1934.2
All of the things people are talking about in terms of the dot-com
revolution during the 1990s-such as the long-awaited emergence of
interactive broadband communications-are here. The infrastructure to
deliver broadband content to PCs, mobile devices, and digital TV sets is
here. But we have lost an important safeguard for broadband-what's
now called "network neutrality" (and what used to be known as "open
access"). The structure that evolved for the internet from the days of dial-
up access was that the network was a neutral party-the phone wire
couldn't determine or shape what content you used. Before AOL merged
with Time Warner in 2000-in part to get access to its cable TV-based
broadband pipeline-it was the leading corporate campaigner for open
access. Once it merged with the cable giant Time Warner, however, AOL
abandoned its call for a national policy designed to keep the broadband
internet from under the control of powerful network gatekeepers. That's
because AOL was now owned by one of the key gatekeepers-Time
Warner owned the second largest cable television distribution platform
(and its high-speed internet service, Road Runner).
All major media mergers have implications for the public interest,
including democratic expression. Mergers involving the future of our
media raise even more important concerns. Like other large cable and
telephone companies, AOL Time Warner wanted to operate a digital dis-
tribution platform where its content received favorable treatment such as
2. Communications Act of 1934, Pub L. No. 416, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended
at47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614).
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faster connection speeds, better processing power, and greater visibility
than competitors (think about the fate of the start-up or not-for-profit
digital content service under such a regime). Therefore, mergers need to
be fought in order to impose safeguards and some form of pubic ac-
countability. That's what a number of groups, including my own Center
for Digital Democracy, were able to do. Professor Lawrence Lessig
played a key role in helping us convince the FTC [Federal Trade Com-
mission] that merger rules for AOL Time Warner were necessary to en-
sure some greater access for competitive internet service providers and
content makers.
This was an attempt to sort of look ahead at what was coming over-
all in the United States' digital content and distribution sphere. These are
global trends, of course, but I do want to focus on the U.S. We will need
to face, I believe, a converged, consolidated, and hyper-commercialized
media environment. There are now greater threats to civil discourse, po-
litical speech, and access to the news and information in civil society
than I think there have ever been before. I called my book Digital Des-
tiny: New Media and the Future of Democracy because it sounds an
alarm about what will likely be unless we act now. I don't think public
interest groups and other advocates are paying sufficient attention to
what is going on in the commercial digital media market. Indeed, the
Google and YouTube deal and the News Corp./Rupert Murdoch takeover
of MySpace are examples of new and extending forms of convergence,
consolidation, and commercialization.
When we talk about the media system, you need to look at three
spheres or three platforms that will determine public consciousness via
the interactive flow of broadband communications: the personal com-
puter (PC), the cell phone or mobile device, and interactive TV (or inter-
net protocol TV). TV will be interactive. It will be personalized. It will
be much more powerful and a very important medium to think about.
The media industries-advertisers, marketers, technology compa-
nies, and the major content companies (such as Time Warner and
Google)-are all working together and have perfected a system designed
to deliver very powerful interactive content wherever you go. A ubiqui-
tous digital media environment will be here with the "always-on, always-
connected" qualities we have discussed. Accompanying this system is an
incredibly sophisticated marketing engine designed to collect data about
each and every one of us to profile each and every one of us. This is so
advertising and messages from powerful brands can be delivered to us,
enveloping us in a system designed to promote their interests (for sales
and influence over our market and, eventually, political choices). As we
speak, this "interactive advertising ecosystem," as they term it, will
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follow you through thousands of web sites as you go through cyberspace,
whether in front of a PC or via interactive television. This system is per-
vasive. It is under the radar screen.
And why is it happening? Because the principal ideology governing
this system, I'm sad to report, is strictly to make profits. It is motivated
in part by the largest advertisers who spend $400 billion globally.
Yahoo! did a very interesting study in 2005 which looks at global youth.3
It is very revealing because it documents the trends I have discussed re-
garding digital media consumption and how marketers can take advan-
tage of it. Yahoo! and others are afraid that the eyeballs of younger peo-
ple, here and abroad, have left television. And the advertisers want to
make sure that they have a system which can reach and influence young
people, who are the emblematic and "with it" users of the new technolo-
gies. It does not matter where the youth are. The advertisers are able to
engage youth via social networks, instant messaging, and broadband
entertainment.
All this marketing is not just about concerns over a direct sale of
products and services. It was very interesting having this conversation
this morning because their marketing has fundamentally changed. This is
something concerned advocates need to be better informed about. The
new approach to marketing is based on what is called "personalization."
If you do a Google search for "Engagement and Advertising Research
Foundation," you will see that advertisers in this country and globally are
engaged in multiple initiatives to make sure they can reach us in very
profound and distinctive ways. Advertisers are now engaged in neuro-
psychological research through what is known as the M14 initiative (run
by the Advertising Research Foundation).4 Marketers are funding viral
marketing and stealth marketing research. It is a whole new array of
techniques to promote what I've termed "brandwashing." And, if adver-
tisers are doing it now, you can be sure politicians and others will follow,
but that's the dominant vision. One-to-one marketing, personal personal-
ization, is the key paradigm here.
Now, we have the new media principally focused on the needs to
serve advertising. This would be bad enough, as they say, but what you
have now are decades of consolidation within the "old" media meaning
fewer companies controlling broadcast, cable, major daily newspapers,
and broadband internet access. Indeed, I spend most of my time in Wash-
3. See Press Release, Yahoo! & OMD, From 'My Generation' to 'My Media Generation':
Yahoo! & OMD Global Study Finds Youth Love Personalized Media (Sept. 27, 2005), available at
http://yahoo.client.shareholder.com/ReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaselD=174993 (describing contents and
results of study) (last visited May 17, 2007).
4. See Ravi Balakrishnan, The Blind Men, ECON. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2006.
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ington fighting such consolidation and helping lead the campaign-a
successful campaign that sort of stopped it for a moment in 2003-
against fewer owners of television stations, cable systems, and phone
companies.
Accompanying this consolidation is a very real and disturbing dete-
rioration of the news media system to effectively engage in reporting and
critical analysis. I am furious that they failed us in terms of the lead-up to
the Iraq war (challenging the fallacious notion of weapons of mass de-
struction). Here's another example-you don't hear anything, at least I
don't in the papers that I read, about what is going on in the Gulf Coast
(such as New Orleans). There are no headlines saying, "Hey, they took
away habeas corpus" (I'm referring to the new Patriot Act), because
there is a deep crisis within the news media today, especially television.
Terrible things have happened to once renowned newspapers, such as
Tribune's Los Angeles Times and Baltimore Sun. Now, bottom-line op-
erators like Dean Singleton operate the San Jose Mercury News because
the venerable Knight Ridder chain was forced to implode by greedy in-
vestors. There have been layoffs, cutbacks, firings, and early retirements.
As a result of media ownership policies and market forces, I believe that
much of the current news media is incapable of serving us effectively.
So, you might say, as Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
Chairman Michael Powell did say during his tenure in 2001-2003 when
he conducted a sweeping review of federal media rules, "you have the
internet." But we no longer can be guaranteed that we have the internet
in the near future as the open and robust medium it is today. Why? Be-
cause the internet was developed as an open system. It was developed by
people who wanted to make sure that all kinds of communications could
get through. The people who created the internet are still around. You
can talk to them. The principle they articulated was called "end-to-end."
Larry Lessig has done the best work explaining, through his accom-
plished and articulate writings, what this means for us.5 The key principle
is nondiscrimination.
It was clear that broadband would be the key way of delivering
online content because you want it fast and it must deliver video-based
applications. The only two industries capable of delivering broadband to
the public in the United States were the cable companies and the phone
companies. They already had the wire. What did the cable industry do to
the FCC in 2002? It lobbied and was able to get the Bush FCC to declare
that when cable delivers broadband, it does not have to act in a nondis-
5. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001).
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criminatory fashion.6 It can put its bits and other bits, and it can deny
other internet service providers, of which there once were around 7,000,
access to its broadband wire (something which federal rules had prohib-
ited with dial-up service). What did the phone companies do? They also
lobbied, and in 2005, they won a similar policy at the FCC eliminating
7nondiscrimination and open access.
We no longer have a system for broadband communications in the
United States that has to operate in a nondiscriminatory manner. That's
what the network neutrality debate is about, and you've seen quotes from
the phone and cable company executives, such as AT&T, saying that
they want to put our content on the fast lane. These same companies have
just bid on, and successfully won, huge chunks of additional wireless
spectrum. Thus, you have consolidation within the broadband market
itself. You have two companies in charge of cable today: Comcast and
Time Warner basically control the cable industry. And, you have three
companies-Verizon, Qwest, and AT&T, which is about to swallow up
Bell South-that are in control of the phone industry.
What you are about to see, I predict, is that this handful of compa-
nies will soon be able to buy a tremendous mass of power through the
purchase of broadcast stations, newspapers, and radio stations without
any public policy to ensure diverse access. Meanwhile and disturbingly,
they have embraced a business model that is focused on pure monetiza-
tion (that's what they call it). Whatever the traffic will bear, that is what I
am going to charge you. If you want your content to be the most effec-
tive, I can put you on my fast lanes and deliver your content to individu-
als (via the PC, mobile, or TV and any mix thereof). Advertising will be
the dominant application. I suggest to you that's a recipe for disaster for
our civil society unless we intervene. Thank you.
Eric Chiappinelli: Thank you, Jeffrey. I appreciate that very much.
Our next speaker is Assistant Professor of Law at the Michigan
State University College of Law. He received his J.D. from University of
Pennsylvania, and then went on to clerk for the Honorable J. Clifford
Wallace in San Diego, the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit. He has been an attorney advisor with the FCC
in both their media bureau and their common carrier bureau, and for a
6. See In re Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Fa-
cilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002) (concerning cable modem service), revd on other grounds, Brand
X Internet Servs. v. F.C.C., 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
7. See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facili-
ties, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853 (2005) (concerning
DSL service).
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time he was engaged in the private practice of law at Jones, Day, Reavis
& Pogue. Please welcome Adam Candeub.
Adam Candeub: Thank you very much. Again, thanks to the Law
Review for its superb work in putting this tremendous symposium to-
gether.
I will first analyze the FCC's current ownership regulations and
their treatment by the courts. The FCC has, almost since its inception as
an agency in 1934, regulated the number of media outlets that one entity
can own and control. Its ownership regulations have evolved into a
highly complex set of rules affecting virtually every media. Recently,
however, its ownership regulations have faced stiff resistance from the
courts; hardly a single regulation has been substantially upheld in the last
decade. Second, with this background, I would like to examine why the
FCC has failed in crafting a workable ownership regulation. Then, I will
briefly talk about some suggestions for reform.
Media ownership regulation limits the size and number of outlets
that one entity can own. The most important rules include:
" the national television multiple ownership rule,8 which caps
the number of television stations a single entity may own
nationwide;
* the national cable ownership rule,9 which limits the size of
cable systems and their degree of integration with program
providers;
* the local television multiple ownership rule,' ° which places
limits on the number of stations a singly entity may own in
a local viewing market;
* the radio/television cross-ownership rule," which limits
joint holdings among those media within a given media
market subject to the 1999 thresholds discussed above;
* the dual network rule, 12 which prohibits combinations
among the four major TV networks;
* the newspaper/broadcast rule, 13  which limits cross-
ownership of television stations and daily newspapers
within the same local media; and
8. National Broadcast Television Ownership Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. 16283-02 (Apr. 4, 2007) (to
be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73.3555(e)).
9. Communications Act of 1934 § 613(f)(l)(A), ch.652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47
U.S.C. § 533(")(l)(A) (2000)); 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(B) (2000); 47 C.F.R. § 76.503 (2006).
10.47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (2006).
11.47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c) (2006).
12.47 C.F.R. § 73.658(g) (2006).
13.47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (2006).
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* the local radio ownership rule, 14 which governs the amount
of consolidation permissible in a local listening market.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act, 15 which
required the FCC to revisit these regulations in various biennial reviews
and discard those that it deemed no longer in the public interest. These
reviews, which largely defended the existing rules, were challenged in
court with very disappointing results (for the FCC, that is). In Sinclair
Broadcasting Group, Inc. v. FCC,16 and Fox Television Stations, Inc. v.
FCC,17 the D.C. Circuit remanded significant portions of the FCC's
regulations, requiring further agency justification.
Consolidating these remands with reviews of other media owner-
ship regulations, then-FCC Chairman Michael Powell attempted signifi-
cant liberalization of the ownership restrictions. The 2002 Biennial
Media Ownership Order raised national and local television ownership
caps and eliminated cross-ownership restrictions. 18 On appeal, however,
the Third Circuit in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC rejected most of
the 2002 Biennial Media Ownership Order, sending the proceeding back
to the FCC for further justification.' 9 These proceedings are still lan-
guishing at the FCC.
That's the current state of the most significant regulations. I would
now like to discuss the justification for ownership restrictions. These re-
strictions seem, at first blush, to raise First Amendment concerns because
by restricting the ability to own media outlets, the FCC is in effect limit-
ing the ability to speak. Yet the Supreme Court has upheld FCC owner-
ship regulations for decades. The classic statement justifying ownership
restrictions is found in National Citizens Community for Broadcasting:
"'[T]he "public interest" standard necessarily invites reference to First
Amendment principles,' and, in particular, to the First Amendment goal
of 'achieving the widest dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources."' 20 The Supreme Court took that very general and
broad principle and essentially gave the FCC carte blanche to craft very
specific ownership regulations on how many radio stations an entity can
14. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a) (2006); see generally CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: FCC MEDIA
OWNERSHIP RULES: CURRENT STATUS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2006), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/70045.pdf (last visited May 17, 2007).
15.47 U.S.C. §§ 151-710 (1996).
16. 284 F.3d 148, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
17. 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
18. In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Comm'n's Broad. Ownership
Rules & Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R.
13620, 13627 (2003).
19. 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
20. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (citations omitted).
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own and how many television stations it can own. Recent Supreme Court
decisions, however, have imposed stricter constitutional scrutiny for the
non-broadcast media.1 It is far from clear whether the FCC's ownership
regulation will be free from constitutional doubt in the future.
Of course, there are darker justifications for ownership regulation
that we must recognize. Many claim that ownership restrictions are really
not about the public good but are about serving politicians. Many of the
ownership restrictions go back to the New Deal-and it is clear that the
genesis of many ownership rules is rooted in political consideration. For
example, consider the memorandum that President Roosevelt sent to
Chairman Howard Fly, a Harvard Law School New Deal bureaucrat. The
memorandum stated, "Will you let me know when you propose to have a
hearing on newspaper ownership of radio stations?" 22 The question re-
sulted in the FCC denying radio licenses to newspaper owners. Roose-
velt's antipathy towards newspaper ownership of radio stations was not
rooted in any profound beliefs in the perils of concentrated media owner-
ship. Rather, Roosevelt harbored a political animus against newspapers
which in the 1930s were the mainstream media. Newspapers, by and
large, opposed much of the New Deal. Roosevelt, who could be a very
vindictive politician, wanted to ensure that they couldn't own radio
stations.
The FCC under Richard Nixon, another chief executive who had is-
sues with the press, instituted a formal prohibition against newspaper
ownership of television stations.23 Again, most observers see this move
as based almost exclusively in politics. 24 As these examples illustrate,
despite the importance and ubiquity of media ownership regulation, they
developed without a coherent plan and without stated goals and clear
justifications. Regulations were haphazard at their best and stomach-
churningly political at their worse.
What was so interesting about the 2002 Media Ownership Biennial
Order 25 is that it marks one of the few times that the FCC attempted to
21. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622 (1994).
22. 2 E. BARNOUW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE GOLDEN WEB
170 (1968).
23. Multiple Ownership Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1074 (1975); see also Susanna
McBee, Justice Department Move on Media Surprised White House, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1974, at
A2; Editorial, The FCC's Ghost from Watergate, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at A18.
24. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1976); see generally Sean Michael McGuire, Media Influence
and the Modern American Democracy: Why the First Amendment Compels Regulation of Media
Ownership, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 689 (2006).
25. In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Comm'n's Broad. Ownership
Rules & Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R.
13620, 13627 (Jun. 2, 2003).
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create an intellectually coherent basis for media ownership regulation. It
forwarded three justifications for limiting media ownership: competition,
diversity, and localism. That its definitions of these terms are problem-
atic perhaps led to the Order's failure before the Third Circuit in
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC.26
The Order defined diversity for purposes of its regulation primarily
as "viewpoint diversity," which in turn was defined as being maximized
by "a larger number of independent owners [because they] will tend to
generate a wider array of viewpoints in the media than would a compara-
tively smaller number of owners., 27 Contrary to past FCC practice, com-
petition was not defined in terms of the higher rates broadcasters charge
advertisers. Instead, the FCC (rather vaguely if not incoherently) tied
competition to the "interest, the convenience, and the necessity of the...
28consuming public," as well as to prices and innovation. Finally, the
FCC defined localism as the inclusion of "programming responsive to
local needs and interests, and local news quantity and quality., 29
The problems with these concepts are many. The definitions, as you
can see, are in many ways almost bizarrely vague. Further, they can con-
flict with each other and resist quantification. Competition conflicts with
diversity. As the famous Steiner and Hotelling-influenced economic
models show, the more media firms in a market, the less diversity in con-
tent, at least under certain conditions. This somewhat counterintuitive
result stems from the fact that media companies will tend to cater to the"common taste"-because that is the largest market. On the other hand, a
monopolist, which by definition already has captured the most common
taste, might have the incentive to cater to different, more diverse tastes in
order to increase its revenue.
Similarly, localism conflicts with diversity. Essentially, the local-
ism mandate will crowd out other types of programming thereby result-
ing in more homogenous programming. If the mandate were not there,
one would likely see more types of programming involving a greater
variety of topics rather than just local topics.
Like individuals and businesses everywhere, government agencies
face conflicting goals all the time. In the case of the FCC, the logical first
step given these conflicting aims would be to envisage optimal levels for
its three divergent goals. And the problem is, of course, measuring or
quantifying optimal levels. Unfortunately, these regulatory concepts re-
sist non-controversial quantification. How in the world do you measure
26. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
27. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 F.C.C.R. at 13627.
28. Id. at 13630-32.
29. Id. at 13633-38.
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what constitutes diversity or localism or even competition given the
oddly vague definitions the FCC adopted?
Consider diversity. How does one determine whether a given media
market is diverse? Economists and social scientists have put forth nu-
merous clever ways of doing so. For instance, Joel Waldfogel of the
Wharton School looked at formats as defined by Duncan, a service for
advertisers that classifies by format every radio station in the country.
30
Waldfogel and his coauthors looked to see whether merged radio con-
glomerates produce more formats. The other approach is to use graduate
students. Put them all in a room, and then ask them whether this format is
different from that format? Or, does this news program provide more or
different news than that news program? These approaches can be very
interesting from an academic perspective. The problem from a regulatory
perspective is that the data is inevitably messy, and regulators have diffi-
culty reviewing inevitably ambiguous and somewhat controversial data.
The FCC's approach to the problem of defining and quantifying di-
versity is to simply sidestep it. As I mentioned earlier, the FCC uses di-
versity of ownership as a proxy for diversity of viewpoint, and so it just
counts heads. Is a media market diverse? The FCC answers this question
simply by counting the number of firms in that market. The first problem
the FCC has faced with this approach is the difficulty in determining
which firms count-the internet, cable, small local newspapers. And,
second, when are there enough firms so that the FCC can determine there
is sufficient diversity?
To expand on the second point, if your diversity standard is just
counting noses, how many noses is enough to make you happy, so to
speak? The FCC has not been able to answer this question satisfacto-
rily--or, at least, in way that has been satisfactory to reviewing courts of
appeals. As I read the major recent cases reviewing the FCC's ownership
rulemakings: Sinclair Broadcasting Group, Inc. v. FCC,31 Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FCC,32 and Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC33 -cases
which for the most part have rejected these rulemakings-these courts
have found the FCC's explanation of when enough is enough
unconvincing, and this failure was crucial in these courts' decisions to
vacate or remand.
So, should we just get rid of media ownership completely? I would
argue that the FCC's regulatory goals--competition, diversity, and
30. Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evidence from
Radio Broadcasting, 116 QUARTERLY J. OF ECONOMICS 3 (2006).
31. 284 F.3d 148, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
32. 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
33. 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
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localism-are too intractable. Instead, the FCC should employ a more
modest goal: simply improving the democratic process by increasing the
output of news about politics. The FCC can alter the quantity and nature
of news production through its regulation of media industry's ownership
and geographic structures. New economic and social science research has
shown that these structural features strongly influence news content. For
instance, the greater degree of overlap between media markets and po-
litical jurisdictions increases the amount of political news coverage.
Media ownership regulation can use these insights to further ownership
structures and geographic media markets that maximize output of politi-
cal news.
Eric Chiappinelli: Thank you very much.
Our next speaker teaches at Marquette University where he is the
Colnik Professor of Communication. His research interests include pri-
vate restrictions on free speech among other things. He's been a journal-
ist, and he has a Ph.D. from Michigan State University. He's an author of
a number of books including Leasing the Ivory Tower: The Corporate
Takeover of Academia,34 Free Radio,35 and Censorship, Inc.36 Please
welcome Lawrence Soley.
Lawrence Soley: It's been interesting to be here, and I'm thankful
to be here, but I tend to do a very different type of research than what has
been presented so far today. I tend to be primarily a quantitative re-
searcher, and I tend to use quantitative techniques to investigate what I
think are important policy issues. To give you an example, Professor
Skover mentioned a study that was done by Ron Collins a number of
years ago called Dictating Content.37 I actually came across this study
first while reading a news report. As I was reading about Collins's study,
the report started talking about a study that I had done that was not yet
released; it was a survey study of newspaper publishers, disclosing what
the level of pressure had been on them from their advertisers. 38 That's the
sort of type of stuff that I do, and so I'm going to try to integrate a lot of
that type of research into the discussion of broadcasting. I'd actually like
to pick up almost exactly where Adam left off in his presentation.
34. LAWRENCE C. SOLEY, LEASING THE IVORY TOWER: THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF
ACADEMIA (1995).
35. LAWRENCE SOLEY, FREE RADIO: ELECTRONIC DISOBEDIENCE (CRITICAL STUDIES IN
COMMUNICATION AND IN THE CULTURAL INDUSTRIES) (1998).
36. LAWRENCE SOLEY, CENSORSHIP, INC.: THE CORPORATE THREAT TO FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES (2002).
37. RONALD K.L. COLLINS, DICTATING CONTENT: HOW ADVERTISING PRESSURE CAN
CORRUPT A FREE PRESS (1992).
38. Lawrence Soley & Robert Craig, Advertising Pressures on Newspapers, J. OF
ADVERTISING, Dec. 1992, at 1-10.
[Vol. 30:959
Corporatization of Communication
A recent study by the Center for Media and Public Affairs shows
that election coverage in my city during 2004 was significantly less than
in the past, and that only about 5% of local news coverage dealt with
local races and ballot issues. 39 This was part of a larger study done in
multiple cities. 40 In Milwaukee, 500 hours of programming was content-
analyzed leading up to the 2004 elections.
One reason for the decline in local news coverage is that it's much
more efficient for large media companies to package national and re-
gional news and to focus on entertainment, which relies very heavily on
video news releases and trailers, than it is to actually hire and send out
into the field journalists who would have to report on just one city. There
are economies of scale in network and regional news production that you
can't get on the local level. Of course, economies of scale make the me-
dia much more profitable for the owners.
The same loss of localism is also associated with radio where chain
broadcasters, for the most part, have eliminated local news, and even the
airing of music by local artists. This is a problem, and part of the
problem was demonstrated in 2002 by a train derailment in Minot, North
Dakota, where toxic fumes had engulfed the city. City leaders tried to
contact the six automated stations in the town, all of which were owned
by Clear Channel Communication. They couldn't get through. As a con-
sequence, it was very difficult, if not impossible, to efficiently inform
people of the town about the toxic cloud that was covering the city. One
person in Minot died, and quite a few people were injured. After that,
Lowry Mays, who's the Chairman of the Board of Clear Channel, ex-
plained his corporation's position. He stated, "We're not in the business
of providing news and information. We're not in the business of provid-
ing well-researched music. We're simply in the business of selling our
customers' products. ' Of course, the customers' products that are being
sold, at least alluded to here, are advertising. So, there's been a reduction
in localism as a result of conglomeration and the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.42
But there have also been some other detrimental economic effects, I
think. One of those is that there are also economies of scale in the selling
39. Center for Media and Public Affairs, 2004 Campaign News Study in Chicago, Milwaukee
and Portland Markets (for the Media Policy Program of the Campaign Legal Center), Aug. 10, 2005,
available at http://www.oregonfollowthemoney.org/FreeAirTime/CMPA%20Study%20FINAL.pdf
(last visited May 17, 2007).
40. Id.
41. Christine Y. Chen, The Bad Boys of Radio: Lowry Mays and Sons Made Enemies Building
Clear Channel into an Empire, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 2003, at 118.
42. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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of advertising time that commands monopoly profits in cities where these
large communication companies operate. To give you an example, Jacor
Communications, which was taken over by Clear Channel Communica-
tion, started gobbling up stations in the Cincinnati market after the pas-
sage of the Telecommunications Act. Jacor managed to capture about
30% of the listening audience in Cincinnati, but was able to gobble up
60% of the advertising revenues. The reason they were able to do that is
because the economies of scale associated with advertising: large adver-
tising agencies find it far more efficient to go to a single source to obtain
advertising than to a multiplicity of small radio stations that have very
fragmented audiences. Not only that, advertising agencies make their
money through commissions on the purchase of advertising time, which
is an incentive to overspend on advertising, making media profitable.
However, despite these problems, I don't think that what has been
said about media consolidation since the passage of the Telecommunica-
tions Act is correct. I don't think that there has been an increase in media
biases or an increase in distortion in reporting. I think there has been
some of that, but I don't think it was caused by the Telecommunications
Act. We hear all kinds of these stories about Viacom taking The Reagans
off CBS and putting it on their pay channel Showtime or Disney's deci-
sion not to distribute Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11 or Sinclair Cor-
poration's decision to air Stolen Honor on their sixty-two broadcasting
stations. We hear about these mainly because there are now a large num-
ber of groups out there, such as Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting
(FAIR), The Center for Media and Public Affairs, The Free Press, The
Media Access Project, and others, that are able to disseminate informa-
tion about such decisions much more efficiently than was possible in the
past, largely because of the new media.
Probably the most widely publicized incident was the boycott of the
Dixie Chicks by country and western radio format stations following the
lead singer's statement in London that she was ashamed to be from the
same state as George Bush. Cumulus Broadcasting, which owns over 300
AM and FM stations, dropped the Dixie Chicks from its stations and
sponsored tractor crushings of their tapes and cds in some of their sta-
tions' parking lots. Cox stations joined the boycott, and some of the
Clear Channel stations did as well. Airplay Monitor, a trade publication
in the broadcasting industry, said that there were about seventy-four sta-
tions that joined the boycott, many of them in the largest markets. As a
result of that, the Dixie Chicks' song, Traveling Soldier, which was at
the number one spot when the story broke, dropped off the charts within
two and a half weeks.
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However, these types of boycotts have been going on for a long,
long time in broadcasting. Even before the passage of the Telecommuni-
cations Act, country stations in Missouri, Kansas, Montana, and else-
where boycotted k.d. lang and her songs after she appeared in a pro-
vegetarian commercial for PETA, People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals. The program director of one station, KBOW in Butte, Montana,
declared, "If she's going to boycott one of our state's major industries,
we're going to boycott her music. 43
These types of boycotts actually go back as far as television. During
the 1950s, there was a blacklist, and it was much more extensive and
pervasive in broadcasting than it was in film. We hear a lot about the
blacklists in the film industry, but they were far deeper and far longer
lasting in broadcasting than they were in film. A reason for that is the
very close relationship between the advertising industry and broadcast-
ers, who rely on advertising dollars for profits, something that filmmak-
ers don't. Because of the clout that advertisers have, they're able to
demand or exert pressure on broadcasters to replace actors or remove
directors of shows that they sponsor.
For example, General Foods back in the '40s and '50s was a large
advertiser and, of course, is still one today. In their case, they pressured
William Sweets into resigning from one of the programs that they spon-
sored, Gangbusters. He was also a director of another one, Counterspy.
He was pressured into resigning from that show, too. The following year
Jean Muir was fired from NBC's The Aldridge Family at the urging of
General Foods. General Foods also received complaints about Philip
Loeb, another actor who was in CBS's The Goldbergs, and General
Foods similarly asked that he be removed, and, in fact, he was. Of
course, this occurred despite New York and California state statutes pro-
tecting employees' political speech and association rights from work-
place retribution.
To make sure that few complaints were received, advertisers devel-
oped whitelists of people who could be hired and blacklists of people
who couldn't be. Often these were developed in association with profes-
sional anti-Communist companies like America Business Consultants,
AWARE Inc., and groups like that. These blacklists weren't broken until
people like John Henry Faulk won judgments against the blacklisters,
and that formally ended blacklisting. The people who were blacklisted
remained in a state of limbo until they were invited back into the
broadcast media-usually it wasn't by the advertisers. It was broadcast
employees that did the inviting. An example of that is provided by Pete
43. Richard Harrington, Radio Stations Ban Singer After Ad, Hous. CHRON., Jul. 3, 1990, at 5.
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Seeger, who was removed from the blacklist after being invited onto the
Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour. That broke the blacklist for Pete See-
ger. Not long after that, CBS killed the Smothers Brothers show because
they started bringing political content in it. The Smothers Brothers have
been on the concert circuit since then and most recently appeared in
Eureka Springs, Arkansas.
Of course, blacklisting didn't just begin in the 1940s or the 1950s.
You can go back throughout history. You can talk about the boycott of
Citizen Kane by William Randolph Hearst and the media that he con-
trolled: Hearst controlled radio stations and newspapers in many differ-
ent cities. In case there's a little bit of confusion there, he prohibited any
mention being made of Citizen Kane in any of his media.
A whole host of other individuals have faced pretty much the same
problem as the Smothers Brothers where they work. They are told they
have to follow the company line. This has been pretty consistent in the
broadcasting industry, and advertisers can still pressure the media, and
oftentimes media companies react to advertising pressures. One of the
reasons, for example, that Viacom moved The Reagans from CBS to
Showtime had to do with an advertising boycott that was being pushed
by members of the Republican Party, and so it made economic sense for
Viacom to shift from its broadcast-advertiser supported network and
move The Reagans to its pay network. Recently, Whoopi Goldberg was
eliminated as a spokesperson for Slim-Fast. She had been, as it was
called, at a celebrity "hate fest" of the Republicans where she made a
crude joke about Bush's name. As a result of that, there was pressure put
on Slim-Fast, and indeed they dropped her as a spokesperson.
But, of course, this pressure doesn't just originate with the political
right. There are examples at both ends. For example, when Laura
Schlessinger signed a contract with Paramount, which is a Viacom sub-
sidiary, to do a television show, another advertising boycott was initiated
against that show by liberals, and the show pretty much went into a rapid
demise as a result.
But advertisers still respond to public pressures, and there are a
huge number of examples of their succumbing to public pressures. Ad-
vertisers also function as pressure groups themselves. I actually have
probably hundreds of anecdotal examples of advertising pressure that
was put on newspapers and broadcasting stations to kill stories that ad-
vertisers didn't like. I did multiple surveys of the broadcasting industry,
of newspapers as well, that show that this type of pressure is pervasive.
As a result of that, advertisers have been able to more and more shape
our media content. For the most part today, the media don't initiate in-
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vestigations of corporations, particularly their advertisers, until after the
demise of the company.
One of the things the tobacco companies did pretty consistently
during the 1950s, the 1960s, the 1970s, and even into the 1980s was to
pressure media into not carrying stories about the dangers of smoking. I
wrote for Mother Jones, having received the Sigma Delta Phi award for a
story I wrote for them. Mother Jones had all their tobacco advertising
pulled out after carrying a story on the dangers of smoking, and this
wasn't something that just happened to Mother Jones. It was something
that happened to a whole host of publications, including Reader's Digest.
So not only are advertisers successful in killing stories and black-
listing individuals and framing content, but more recently we have seen
them being successful in killing commercials for public interest groups.
For example, I'm originally from the Twin Cities where the Prairie Is-
land Sioux Tribe tried to buy time for commercials criticizing a large
advertiser, Northern States Power Company, and broadcasting stations in
that market refused to sell them time.
I think there is something that can be done. I don't want to sound
like a dinosaur going back into past history, but there was in effect until
1987 something called the "Fairness Doctrine," 4 which I think was the
single most important doctrine for assuring fairness in broadcasting. If
the Fairness Doctrine had still existed when Sinclair Broadcasting said
that they were going to air Siolen Honor, the anti-John Kerry program,
Kerry would have had an opportunity to reply. Under the Fairness Doc-
trine, if broadcasting stations carry commercials for one advocacy group,
other advocacy groups could demand time as well. Thus, I believe in the
Fairness Doctrine and in resurrecting it. In fact, the FCC was given the
power to promote reply time in terms of tobacco advertising under the
Banzhaf decision, 45 a policy that is badly needed today.
Eric Chiappinelli: And now we'll have replies. Thank you, Larry.
Thank you to all three of you.
Jeffrey Chester: I would like to add something; I left out what we
should do about it. As I said before, take the principles, but update them
to a new environment, and we need policies. We need to reframe the
First Amendment to the digital landscape. We need policies. We need
projects, and we need business models. In other words, we're not going
to get the kind of media environment we want unless we go out and cre-
ate it. It's not going to be delivered to us by the major media companies
in my opinion. That includes the Googles and Yahoos. So, we need to
44. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969). The FCC's abolishment of the
Fairness Doctrine was affirmed in Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
45. Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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think about it. There's a phrase called access to knowledge, which is a
very useful phrase, but we need to create this access on multiple levels.
I don't want to go into it further, but imagine the kind of media sys-
tem locally and nationally that you want. I suggest to you we need to do
it, but we may have to do it by selling advertising but doing it in a re-
sponsible way, because we need to have, in fact, business models for this
new system while we wait for the policies. But we clearly have to
intervene now in this new media market place.
Audience Participant: Well, I'm kind of a skeptic of the whole
thing; that is, the whole business media model. [Professor Soley] gave a
nice little summary of all the censorship that's going on for several dec-
ades now, long before the internet or recent media consolidation. It
seems to me we need to remove the media, or at least a large segment of
it, from commerce. I mean, let's think about buying political candidates.
I mean, we sort of do that, but, you know, it's not really kosher, one dol-
lar, one vote. How much better does it work when it's one dollar for one
hour on TV?
Jeffrey Chester: I didn't mention this, but I do think that one of the
key issues for the advocates concerned about applicable communications
is to understand what the system looks like and getting access to all three
platforms, to understand the business models that are being imposed, and
to understand how they want to charge for this access, let alone the pri-
vacy issues, and to think about what the public policies are so you can
have political communications and civic discourse and access to infor-
mation across all those platforms.
But there's no longer really a kind of spectrum scarcity to regulate
in that way. You have this kind of giant broadband system with all the
media merging. You're not going to get the corporations out of it. It's too
late. When you look at the deals made by the Viacoms and the largest
advertising companies and the Googles, it's too late. I think we have to
be realistic here. They created this structure where advertising, market-
ing, and content are all intertwined and are ubiquitous throughout the
system. They've eliminated the public policy safeguards. We've got to
think of real alternatives while people also work on a philosophical
approach to redoing it.
Audience Participant: As far as I could tell, all this structure is set
in a bunch of laws, not even in the Constitution. I guess there are certain
people who say that the Constitution requires private ownership of the
airwaves and media, but except for those people on the far right extreme,
you're talking about a legal framework, and just as the laws were created
to favor corporate consolidation, certainly the laws can be amended and
changed to authorize public ownership.
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Jeffrey Chester: Let me say one more thing. I think I may be more
of a realist. They are about to unleash this. This is going to be a powerful
torrent of commercialized, focused media.
So, yes, in the long term we need to, in fact, create the public
sphere. And maybe you could take it back, but you know what? You
don't have that much time, because young people in particular like the
advertising. They have fewer problems about the data collection. They're
going to be shaped by this market in a very profound way in terms of
their psychosocial development. And if we want to get them as citizens,
we have to act now while folks work on the long-term principles.
They've won it because our side has been weak and because the FCC's
been politically corrupt since 1927.
Adam Candeub: Since '34. The FCC was established in 1934.
Jeffrey Chester: No, it was under the Federal Radio Commission
as well.
Adam Candeub: If I could respond about the laws, I mean, it's in-
teresting to realize that most of the stuff that I went through was promul-
gated under the very broad public interest standard. Since a lot of this has
happened through the hidden corridors of power in Washington, these
rules are the result of complex negotiations and political power plays
among the FCC, Congress, and communications industry.
Once in a while, Congress makes a media ownership rule directly.
So, for instance, the national local broadcast for television limit of 39%
came out of a Republican Congress because they didn't like Michael
Powell's moving it up to 45%.46 The reasons for this I think are really
quite complex. Politicians like their local broadcasters. I wonder why.
Who else would report about them?
Jeffrey Chester: But I'll tell you why it was at 39%. It was because
Viacom and News Corporation were at 39%, right?
Adam Candeub: Right, and that's why cable was at 30% because
that's where TCI was. But I think there are mechanisms for people, and
Congress is responsive for a variety of reasons on some of these ideas.
Audience Participant Erik Jaffe: What would be wrong with the
sort of old-fashioned digital public square model? Rather than taking
over the airwaves, the government just sort of created common space that
would be open in the same way the public square was open so that
everyone had minimum access, and it could be a substantial minimum
without shutting down the private?
46. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99
(2004); National Broadcast Television Ownership Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. 16283-02 (Apr. 4, 2007) (to
be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73.3555(e)).
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Jeffrey Chester: That's what I think they need to do, and it needs
to be throughout the digital landscape wherever political consciousness is
formed. They need to create this kind of open space. We need to build
the institutions, provide the data, but we need more than just the space.
We need guaranteed access into the portals, into the very mechanisms
that will be used to garner the public's attention, so civic content isn't
sidelined and marginalized.
Eric Chiappinelli: Let me take a moderator's prerogative to ask
this question. As I understand, sort of the basic thrust of all of you is that
the media these days is essentially advertising driven because the owners
of the media rely on advertising revenues, which essentially leads to both
concentration of ownership and homogenization of content. My question
is if you move to this open access, with every person with an access, you
have a media that is public access television, and we've all watched that.
Jeffrey Chester: That's not a homogenization. It's the YouTube
model really, but they will own whatever. They will have a piece of all
that diverse content, but that diverse content will reflect the kind of nar-
row parameters that the advertisers in particular wish to fulfill.
Eric Chiappinelli: Which I assume then goes to giving people
what the advertisers think they want. And with increasing sophistication,
they know what people want. Why is it we should invest public policy
and resources to provide things that readers won't read, listeners won't
listen to, and viewers won't view?
Adam Candeub: I'm not a big advocate necessarily of huge market
regulation. If people don't want news, the media shouldn't give it to
them. However, presumably people want democracy, and that desire has
certain consequences. Effective democracy requires citizens to have in-
formation about government. They use this information to monitor their
elected officials. Where do they get this information? The press, the
news. After all, in order to learn what your politicians are doing, it's
much easier to watch the news than make incessant FOIA requests or
watch C-Span 24/7.
Thus, it's not so much that people want news more than they want
to watch Desperate Housewives. It's that if they want democracy, they
need information about their elected officials. Consequently, media own-
ership policy should be directed at creating industrial structures that
maximize the output of news. Now, viewing the purpose of media regu-
lation to reduce the monitoring costs of government by encouraging the
output of news presents interesting questions of which jurisdiction's
monitoring costs should be reduced. In other words, about which juris-
diction should regulation aim to maximize news coverage.
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You mentioned public access. I have a newborn, so I'm up late
night, and I also have cable. I have the basic system, so I do watch a lot
of public access, and I know a lot about my local high school's student
government, which public access covers. Interestingly, I don't know very
much about my state government, which happens to be just a few miles
down the road in Lansing. And why is that? Well, because the cable
franchise is done locally, and, therefore, public access channels tend to-
wards local news. Franchising is not done on the state level, and that's an
example of how ownership structures set by the government influence
the type of news that-
Jeffrey Chester: Adam, you're wrong. It's not fair for you to say
that. The fact that it's not state-based news is because the broadcasting
industry, which has those stations, and the cable systems, which have
production power, have decided not to do news, not to report on the state
capitol, not to invest in news. Look what's going on with NBC just yes-
terday: $700 million in cutbacks in news. All the consolidations with the
cutbacks in news have caused the crisis going on. Anybody in journalism
knows about the crisis going on with local journalism and national jour-
nalism because they have made political and economic decisions. Hence,
we need to open up to the extent to allow the people that want to do it to
do it.
Adam Candeub: Jeff, if we allocated spectrum not on a local level
but on a state or national level-
Jeffrey Chester: It should be everywhere.
Adam Candeub: Hold on one second. So if 93.7 were the state fre-
quency so that no matter where you were in the state you could listen to
that channel, which is not the case now, then have you created economies
of scale so that the private companies would, in fact, create more state
news? My only point is that there's a relationship between the media in-
dustry's structure, its ownership and geographic features, and the type of
scale economies that we get and consequently the news that we get.
Audience Participant David Skover: Many of the concerns that
you, Adam, and you, Larry, have voiced I think were tied to older forms
of media where the catalyzation costs of entering the market are so high
that essentially we had scarcity. You couldn't go out and build your own
television station to get your viewpoint out.
The free speech libertarians who look at the digital market are mak-
ing the argument that despite concerns that you're talking about, Jeff,
that the upstart costs of becoming your own publisher, your own pro-
ducer, your own distributor of information are so low that, for all
practical purposes, we don't have to concern ourselves anymore with the
Fairness Doctrine, the regulation of scarce resources, et cetera. This is
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particularly going to be the case as all the media converge into sort of
internet-driven technology. Now, we don't even have to worry about the
television using a limited spectrum because television is going to be in
this one internet-driven medium, and now we could all potentially
become television producers, too.
Given the future technology, I'm wondering if many or all of your
concerns are not somewhat alleviated.
Lawrence Soley: Except Jeff s.
David Skover: But, I actually wonder about his concern.
Jeffrey Chester: No, indeed because the TV platform and the mo-
bile platform are, in fact, consolidated, concentrated. You don't have
access to them. Mobile platform, which is key, and the interactive televi-
sion platform are closed platforms.
David Skover: Okay, so net neutralities.
Jeffrey Chester: No, no, no. They're closed platforms. They are
being designed, and hence they're unregulated. The broadband content
that comes through them, unless you can rig it up, will be controlled by
the network provider.
David Skover: I see. Now, would you address, though, whether
you think your two concerns are really relevant?
Adam Candeub: My point is not based on the scarcity doctrine.
Market structure plays a role in determining the type and quantity of po-
litical news, and media regulation must account for this.
And you're right, the internet has lowered the barriers of entry in-
credibly, but are people writing news, writing about what's going on in
the state government? Are they engaging in investigative reporting of the
tedious-yet vital-goings on in the various bureaucracies? I would ar-
gue that they are not. Citizen reporters have yet to emerge, and there will
always be a need for a professional press to sort, clarify, and make easily
readable the news. If that's the case, then I would say that there is some
need to look at the media markets and the role government plays in
influencing their structure.
Lawrence Soley: Every time a new media appears, there are a
group of people who bury the previous media. So when radio originated,
they said newspapers were dead. When television appeared, they said
newspapers and radio were dead. Well, they haven't died. They are still
major media. In fact, most surveys show that most people go to broadcast
television to obtain local news information, and it remains the high
source of profitability for broadcasting stations. I got up today. I went
into the restaurant, and they had the NBC Today Show on. I got a local
newspaper that was hanging on my door, and I read it. This is still the
way that news tends to be consumed.
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Now, when new technology are available and it's opened up, often
times the FCC makes previous licensees those that will get into the new
portion of the spectrum. They did that with the upper AM band rather
than opening it up to new licensees. It was provided to those that already
had AM broadcasting licenses. When they gave licenses for digital tele-
vision, they didn't expand those. They gave it to current licensees.
That's really the issue. These technologies remain major sources of
information. The doctrines that existed previously I think are still
relevant, and they provided a type of access and debate that didn't exist
previously.
Audience Participant: My concern is why should they supply
things to a public who don't want it and won't listen to it? It's an as-
sumption that the people don't want good information, rather than that
people don't have a choice about the information being fed to them. Pub-
lic television is an example. The people have to pay to get it. We send
donations. We do that. Now, these are people who don't have big dollars,
and they're trying to get an alternative to what is fed to us. This attitude
seems to be that the people are just too dumb, like kind of what the fram-
ers saw. We're not capable. We're too arbitrary. It scares me that we
seem to now be trying to put it down on ourselves that we don't want to
have an option. This is what we want, we keep being told, and that's why
we're giving it to you.
Insofar as that's what America wants to be, then I guess we buy it.
But if it's not, in a democratic society what we want, because a democ-
ratic society suggests you look at the society and you do something for
the whole, then we might want to argue for difference. We might want to
open up the opportunity for people to have access to television.
Jeffrey Chester: All of sudden anyone can be a content provider,
and I believe that. We encourage people to create the kind of program-
ming which talks to us seriously and entertains us seriously. They can
make the money. They can make a living.
You think about news channels. Do you know how many reporters
want to work somewhere else? Doing investigative reporting about
what's really going on? They would love to. If they had access to distri-
bution, they could make it. I said there are no channels owned by Afri-
can-Americans, and very few channels owned by women, in fact, hardly
any channels owned by women. There is a market there. We have to
allow things and consciously foster the creation of those markets and
services.
Audience Participant: I'm just getting really tired of your mislead-
ing comments you made in your last comment about what's available in
the political market, and maybe you guys are all living in the clouds here
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and just are focusing on your larger market. I come from a smaller com-
munity, and for one there is a low political rate with advertising, and it
also happens to be owned by a woman, who owns several TV stations.
And so, please-
Jeffrey Chester: I'm sorry, I meant national. I meant the national
networks, the national cable networks, and the national cable systems.
None of the national cable programming networks, none of the national
cable systems, and none of the national television broadcast networks are
owned by women. Only 3% of the radio television stations are owned by
African-Americans. So there may be things in the local market, I'm glad,
but nationally, it's a very poor picture.
Audience Participant: You know that's not going on in the whole
United States. I mean, I know there are challenges, the biggest ones be-
ing why some of the restrictions that apply to over-the-air broadcasting
don't apply to cable and why we had to have high-definition television. I
mean, the cost is the same for the larger markets as it was for the smaller
market. How does that benefit us as a society?
Jeffrey Chester: Well, ask the National Association of Broadcast-
ers because they lobbied for that in 1996 as part of the Act.47 The NAB
was one of the biggest giveaways of public property: $70 billion given to
incumbent broadcasters. They lobbied that, and they inserted that into the
'96 Act.
Audience Participant: I was very troubled by what Professor
Soley had to say about the ability of private television companies to con-
trol the content of political messages and pick and choose what messages
they want to allow and not allow. This issue has come across my desk.
I'm an ACLU lawyer. Is there anything we can do about it? What's your
view on this? The Fairness Doctrine sounds like it's dead. Is there
anything else out there?
Lawrence Soley: Well, there have been attempts to resurrect the
Fairness Doctrine. I don't think it needs to be dead. I think that Congress
can pass it. The idea of the Fairness Doctrine isn't just a scarcity issue. I
mean, certainly that's part of it, but it's also based on sort of a public pol-
icy approach that is one that I think applies to cattle grazing. Large
ranchers are allowed to use public lands for their own profit. But, at the
same time, they're not allowed to post signs that the land is private, and
they cannot deny legal access to other members of the public.
That was one of the underlying philosophies of the Fairness Doc-
trine. It applied to everything except candidates running for public office,
47. See CYNTHIA GORNEY, THE BUSINESS OF NEWS: A CHALLENGE FOR JOURNALISM'S NEXT
GENERATION 52-54 (discussing the National Association of Broadcasters' lobbying efforts regard-
ing the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
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so section 315 of the Telecommunications Act applies to candidates run-
ning for office. 48 We had a discussion about that previously. In theory,
it's the lowest unit cost. If that is given to one candidate for public office,
then it has to be given'to the others. Sometimes they don't do that. So,
everybody's paying the highest rate, but everybody's paying the same
rate rather than getting advertising discounts because of quantity pur-
chases, which is typical of commercial advertisers. The answer is that,
with the exception of political candidates running for federal public
office, there's nothing that can be done unless the Fairness Doctrine is
resurrected. And even then it would require going back to the Banzhaf
interpretation of the Fairness Doctrine which applied the doctrine to
advertising.
Jeffrey Chester: Can I ask you this? That's not even the way TV's
going to work. You're going to be downloading individual programs. So
think about it. What should the Fairness Doctrine look like in the digital
age? Maybe if party A paid Comcast money to download their program
onto your hard drive or your TiVo, which is what's going to happen be-
cause that's all for sale, then there need to be public policies to ensure
other points of view have an opportunity at that rate.
That's how you have to think: where it is, where it's going, and
what do we do about it because these guys are already working on it. Go
to Comcast Spotlight and do a search if you want to see personalized ad-
vertising, political advertising, and where it's going.
Audience Participant Tamara Piety: I think this panel illustrates
why the media is not really an adequate watchdog for the kind of issues
that were raised in our panel. This is one of the things that the public
wants, to escape from advertising-with TiVo being one example of
that. The [media] keep throwing roadblocks in trying to get away from
that by trying to find other ways to reach us, so it's impossible to escape
from advertising. I look at some of this stuff, and I think: why is it that
all research on human subjects is being completely unregulated? I mean,
they send this stuff to us to see how we would react and then craft the
environment around us.
Jeffrey Chester: Well, look, we need to intervene. What they are
doing is creating this kind of purposely immersive virtual reality person-
alized data collecting environment, associating the content with the
advertisers and the brand entertainment model, and where they are going
is deceptive and unfair. We should be engaged in a host of proactive le-
gal and advocacy efforts around it. I absolutely agree, and I think you
can try to do something. But as I said, I'm concerned it's already so big,
48.47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006).
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it's already the model they've all embraced, so it's going to be very hard
to disable it now, except for the worst aspects like those for kids. Some
of the worst aspects can be disabled.
Audience Participant: I'm wondering about your view of the fu-
ture and this approach. Is it going to be applied in areas other than enter-
tainment? There's a whole realm of areas where there's an interactive
approach such as healthcare. I mean, there's no limit.
Adam Candeub: Do you have a discount card in your supermar-
ket? That's a wonderful example. They're keeping track of exactly what
you eat, and they're stocking their shelves so that they have the food you
want. Is that an Orwellian manipulation of your reality? I don't think that
it is.
Jeffrey Chester: It's on when you turn on the TV. When you go on
your mobile phone, the ad will be there. That's what they already are
doing, what's underway already. I think that is Orwellian, and that's why
the companies, including Microsoft, are opposed to a privacy policy
where consumers would have to opt in. They don't want us to opt in be-
cause once you're given the choice, they know no one will allow them to
collect all that kind of data. They understand your psychological
vulnerabilities.
Audience Participant: My point is partly that when we talk about
public policy, the concern is where we should be advocating. It's not just
the entertainment information industry. It's much larger.
Jeffrey Chester: It's across the board, right.
Audience Participant: I'm not so sure, though, that we are as weak
and vulnerable as is being portrayed because, in some cultures and in
some countries, steps are being taken to emancipate people, and people
can individually make those choices, too. You don't have to watch. But,
in other places, you can get open source software. In some places in the
world, such as in Munich right now, open source software is the system
that's being used by government entities.
We happen to believe right now that in the United States maybe
there's nothing we can do, but I would suggest there are things we can
do, and perhaps this is the seedpod. Here and other places that you gen-
tlemen and other speakers here are addressing, we're the seedpods for
making that change. Perhaps not immediately, but the change is occur-
ring in other places on the other sides of the oceans and on the other
sides of national boundaries.
Just because here we feel helpless doesn't mean we cannot make
those massive changes because abroad they are making them, notwith-
standing the fact we're stuck in the mud over here.
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Jeffrey Chester: It's true that in Europe right now there's a debate
about whether to have network neutrality. Companies want to eliminate
network neutrality. There are privacy safeguards in the EU that we
should replicate. We should do more things like Larry Lessig did with
his Creative Commons. There are models that we desperately need to
embrace here but that will take a political movement on our part to do
that. I agree with you.
Audience Participant: I would like the panel's response to this. I
heard this statement maybe ten years ago on a panel on public broadcast:
the accuracy of the news is inversely proportional to the size of the
ownership.
Adam Candeub: You know, localism and local ownership of
broadcast are generally considered to advance civic participation, but I
actually think that's a debatable claim. In fact, the emphasis on local
ownership may hide the more problematic ownership structure-
common ownership of the press with other industries and commercial
interests.
Certainly an alliance of a local interest with other large local busi-
ness concerns could have a tremendous slanting approach on the news.
The effect of that would be much worse because in small, isolated com-
munities there are fewer sources of news. If the owner of a local plant is
also the owner of a local newspaper or radio station, I think the people
would be much worse off than if there was only one independently
owned media outlet without financial interests in any other industry.
So I would disagree with that. I think that it's a very difficult
determination.
Lawrence Soley: Well, I'm not sure what you mean by localism.
I'd like to point out that you had up there on your power point a refer-
ence to the Prometheus Project,49 and the Prometheus Radio Project was
actually an attempt to localize radio. It was an attempt to get low wattage
stations on the air, some that were five watt and some that were fifty watt
stations. The Federal Communications Commission at the last moment
decided that they wanted to legalize these stations and went ahead and
put out a call for filings to get low power licenses. That was an example
of more people in history filing comments with the FCC than in any
other time in history. They adopted a policy to establish these local
power free radio stations, and at the last moment the National
Association of Broadcasters lobbied Congress to, in effect, stop this from
taking place, so there wasn't any local market in any medium.
49. Prometheus Radio Project, http://www.prometheusradio.org (last visited May 18, 2007).
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Adam Candeub: I'm not supporting that. The only question was, is
local ownership necessary, or how is it related to the accuracy or the
skewing of news? It's an open question I think.
Jeffrey Chester: Look, there's no question in my mind that con-
solidation and concentration, which has been a long-term problem with
the press, has had a deleterious effect upon the news media. The FCC
allowed the takeovers to occur in '83 and '84 when TV was just a
"toaster with pictures," according to the FCC chairman at that time. Un-
der the Reagan regime, they allowed the takeover of all three of the net-
works. That's when the investigative units were killed. That's when the
overseas bureaus were eliminated. That's when all the networks merged
their voting return operations. They created a company called Voter
News Service that played a sad role in the 2000 presidential election.
Local ownership is key, and I think the best example is the Seattle
Times. There was only one publisher who stood up for the public interest
advocates to fight media consolidation, and that was Frank Blethen,
owner of the Seattle Times. There's something to be said about having a
local independent ownership and groups that care about the community.
Audience Participant: Well, I was just going to debate your point
about the local ownership of the Seattle Times. I know that the Times
likes to emphasize it's a locally owned company, but it's also trying to
shut down its competition, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, which is owned
by Hearst. I understand you to be advocating for a diversity of viewpoint.
It seems to me it's inconsistent to say that local ownership is the answer
in and of itself.
Jeffrey Chester: It's one of the answers. There was a joint operat-
ing agreement that Blethen and Hearst have. I think local owners are bet-
ter. This would not be possible given the policies which the FCC, under
Chairman Mike Powell, supports (a view shared by many large media
companies). Under Powell's policy, in one large community, you could
own three TV stations, eight radio stations, the daily newspaper, the ca-
ble company, and one of the principal internet service providers in the
town. One company with that massive power without any safety guards
for broadband and non-discriminatory access, that's what they wanted.
That's likely what they're going to get. That's what we're facing.
Lawrence Soley: Let me make one last comment about low-power
radio, because that still is a possibility. It is actually being implemented
outside of medium and large metropolitan areas because of the two-
channel separation that exists. That sort of technology is available. It's an
old technology, but it's certainly new in the way that it will be used in
the United States.
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I would argue that this type of technology and this type of approach
to broadcasting enhance discourse in a lot of ways. Let me give you an
example. Local advertisers who aren't chains in a large market could
advertise just in the local area on these lower-powered stations. They
could effectively compete with chains like McDonald's, which get these
huge economies of scale from buying one spot or two spots on that tele-
vision station, and they get it to support maybe twenty, twenty-five, and
thirty different food stores, if you want to call them that. You cannot
compete in the advertising world today in broadcasting unless you get
those types of economies of scale. And to some degree, the reason why
we have this homogenization all over the United States is because of the
broadcast media and the economies of scale that are available to these
large retail chains.
Low-power broadcasting is something that could challenge that. It
could localize the advertising and make messages available more broadly
for smaller advertisers, but at the last moment, the NAB lobbied to kill it.
This is what my book, Free Radio, is about, free radio electronic civil
disobedience and how the free radio movement put these stations on de-
spite the FCC trying to shut them down.5 °
Jeffrey Chester: This is who we're going to have to fight: the
National Association of Broadcasters, the National Cable Telecommuni-
cation Association, the National Advertising Association, a host of think
tanks, and a host of universities they help fund.
The telecommunications industry has built a very formidable, legal,
and intellectual, political infrastructure. They're spending tens of mil-
lions of dollars flooding the airwaves in Washington and elsewhere over
this Telecommunications Bill 51 that is now before Congress that ends the
only policies that we've developed in this country to ensure there is some
localism, namely the local cable franchise. That's gone because it's in
the way of the phone and cable companies. They don't want to have any
kind of local accountability, so there's a huge infrastructure beyond the
NAB that we have to reckon with.
David Skover: Larry, when answering my earlier question, you
quite correctly said that because there is a new medium, it's not as if the
old media goes away.
I absolutely acknowledge that, but as Marshall McLuhan would
say, as soon as there is a new medium that becomes dominant, the old
50. SOLEY, supra note 35.
51. Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252,
109th Cong. (2006).
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media become classic or they become art.12 What he meant by that is that
in order to justify their existence, they have to give a different value that
is not competitive with what the new dominant medium is doing just as
well as they. I think we're seeing this, for example, in the newspaper.
Increasingly newspaper content is altering and we're getting news analy-
sis which is the kind of commentary that arguably the newspaper can do
better than the Drudge Report on the internet.
I'm not certain what we're going to see in terms of the new formats
that come in more traditional media because of the new medium. But one
thing I probably would be more certain of, just because if one looked at
the evolution of media you see it again and again, is that the content for-
mat is likely to change in order that the medium be seen as providing
something different, something better than what you'd be getting out of
the new medium. So I'm wondering if the analyses that you're doing, not
just you, but that the panel is doing, is not taking account of that
phenomenon.
Lawrence Soley: Well, I think it does take into account that phe-
nomena. When you talk about internet distribution news, you're primar-
ily talking about the internet distribution of newspaper companies
reformatting the medium with which they deliver pretty much the same
message. It doesn't matter whether it's the Washington Post online,
whether it's CNN.com, or whether it's USA Today online. For the most
part, we're talking about the same companies.
It's conceivable that they could, for example, have pay-per-access,
and many of them now are doing that, or they could disseminate the
newspapers electronically, and you could conceivably print it out or
could print it out in your own home. It's not a question of technology as
much as it is the companies that are actually controlling it. That's one
thing.
And the second thing is that, yes, we do have new technologies, but
the ratings for CNN are very, very small compared to what the network
evening news is. Of course, one of the problems with the network eve-
ning news is that it's a skewed demographic. This is why if you turn it
on, you see a lot of ads for Viagra, anti-cholesterol drugs-all kinds of
drugs. The networks have been attempting to adjust to that by bringing in
new anchors, repackaging it, and repositioning it, but the networks aren't
the same companies as the new media. If you're talking about Viacom,
you know, you're talking about CBS. If you're talking about Disney,
52. See generally MARSHALL McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN
(MIT Press 1964).
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you're talking about ABC. If you're talking about Fox, you're talking
about Twentieth Century Fox.
Jeffrey Chester: Find yourself a tween. Look at your 8 year old-
that's where they're focusing the structural changes. It's an entirely new
approach to youth media. The system is being structured to focus on
them. They're the key group.
The Web 2.0, the social networking model of building community
and of being there and everywhere, will be, in fact, the kind of dominant
model for television, for radio, for everything. As Larry pointed out, I am
concerned that you have the major players of old and new media working
together. They've eliminated these safeguards. They've eliminated own-
ership. The model of this community goes back to advertising, because
they understand that word of mouth and developing relationships with
individuals is the most effective way to sell a product for life-long ser-
vice. They are creating that system using the Web 2.0 model to expand
their power and worldview. That's what we need to face, and we need to,
I believe, create an effective media alternative that promotes the civic
sphere.
Eric Chiappinelli: Jeffrey Chester, Adam Candeub, and Lawrence
Soley, thank you very much.
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